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Abstract: Health care is currently witnessing increased specialization as well as a need for integrated care delivery. As a
result, care organizations should collaborate and in order to facilitate this, e-health collaboration platforms are
being created. Access control is a primary concern for such cross-organizational platforms and efficient access
control management is crucial to their adoption. Federated access control is a potential technique to achieve
this and our experience in multiple research projects shows that federated authorization is an essential building
block for future collaboration platforms. However, this technology still faces open research challenges. This
paper wants to spark research on these challenges by motivating the need for federated authorization in the
context of a real-world collaborative care platform. Based on this case study, we also discuss the state of the
art and present a set of key requirements to realize wide-scale adoption of federated authorization in practice.
1 Introduction
Health care is increasingly being delivered as a
collaborative effort between multiple specialized care
organizations and in order to facilitate this, collabora-
tive e-health platforms are being created. For exam-
ple, Vitalink (Vitalink, 2013) facilitates the sharing
of medication and vaccinations of patients between
medical professionals. Another example is OCare-
CloudS (OCareCloudS, 2014), a research project that
aims to facilitate information sharing between the
multiple organizations that provide home care to a
certain care receiver.
A primary concern in these collaboration plat-
forms is security. The data that are shared amongst
the care organizations concern patients and as a result,
data protection legislation applies. Cryptographic
techniques can provide storage and transmission se-
curity, but in order to share data in a controlled way,
application-level access control is required as well.
The goal of access control is to limit the access
of users to the resources in the application by enforc-
ing the access control policies of the organization that
controls these resources (Samarati and de Vimercati,
2001). Access control is therefore highly interrelated
with the user management of that organization: user
accounts have to be created, access control policies
have to be deployed and the access control data of
users have to be managed. Examples of these data
are the names of users, their roles in the organization,
their birth date, their location, their department, their
shifts, their assigned patients etc.
However, realizing access control for a collabo-
ration platform is challenging because of the multi-
ple organizations involved. These organizations often
share the ownership of the data and should all be able
to express their access constraints. However, these or-
ganizations remain separate domains in terms of ad-
ministration and security, and do not necessarily trust
each other completely. Amongst others, this leads to
challenges such as sharing the identities of users be-
tween these organizations, integrating the multiple ac-
cess control infrastructures, and evaluating the access
control policies in a way that performs well and keeps
the sensitive access control data of all organizations
confidential. This paper is not the first to identify
these challenges, e.g., (Poortinga-van Wijnen et al.,
2010), but as we will show, not many of them have
been addressed properly.
Federated access control is a potential answer
to these challenges. While federated authentication
is an established technology (e.g., (OpenId, 2013)
and (SAML, 2005)), our experience with the OCare-
CloudS research project shows that federated autho-
rization is necessary to address these challenges com-
pletely. Similar to federated authentication, federated
authorization externalizes policy evaluation from an
application. In the short term, this technique is re-
quired for the adoption of collaborative platforms by
large organizations that require centralized user man-
agement. In the long term, it enables efficiently eval-
uation of cross-organizational policies while keeping
sensitive access control data confidential.
However, while the concept of federated autho-
rization is fairly intuitive, its realization still poses
many challenges by itself, especially in realistic fed-
erations. Therefore, we want to spark research on
federated authorization by motivating the need for it
using the case study of the OCareCloudS collabora-
tion platform. Although this paper focuses on a sin-
gle case study, our research on federated authorization
is based on and validated in multiple application do-
mains (PUMA, 2014; SPARC, 2014).
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows: Section 2 describes the case study of the collab-
orative care platform. Section 3 illustrates the need
for federated authorization in this case study. Sec-
tion 4 extrapolates a set of key requirements for fed-
erated authorization. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Case study: a collaborative care
platform
The case study focuses on a software platform that
aims to streamline home care by improving the com-
munication between the multiple involved organiza-
tions. The platform therefore digitizes the informa-
tion that these organizations share, such as prescrip-
tions of and notes about the care receiver.
Together, the various organizations involved in the
collaboration platform behave as a federation. This
means that these organizations have set up collabora-
tion agreements, but still remain separate domains in
terms of security and administration, and do not nec-
essarily trust each other completely.
Figure 1 illustrates the federation of organizations
involved in the care platform. While this figure only
illustrates a part of the complete federation, it al-
ready shows that a large amount of organizations is
involved, such as general practitioner practices, elder
homes, daily care organizations, physiotherapist prac-
tices, home nursing organizations, hospitals and cater-
ing services. Some of these are directly involved (e.g.,
the meal delivery service), but others get involved be-
cause of business relationships with directly involved
organizations (e.g., the caterers) or because of the in-
tegration of the platform with the Electronic Health
Record (EHR) for sharing patient data on a wider
scale (e.g., other hospitals). Figure 1 also illustrates
that the organizations in the federation are of very dif-
ferent nature, ranging from core-medical (e.g., gen-
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Figure 1: Part of the federation of organizations involved in
the collaborative care platform. As shown, such a platform
quickly leads to a federation of a large amount of organiza-
tions and individuals of different nature.
eral practitioners and hospitals) to supporting (e.g.,
caterers), and from large organizations (e.g., hospi-
tals) to small organizations (e.g., a medical imaging
practice) and even individuals (e.g., family, friends,
general practitioners). Moreover, this federation is
dynamic in the sense that new organizations can join
the federation over time or others can leave.
The remainder of this section outlines the specific
access control challenges that arise in the context of
such large and complex federations.
2.1 Access control challenges
While the collaboration platform enables easier cross-
organizational information sharing, the data in this
platform are sensitive, personal and medical. There-
fore, the platform should also enable more controlled
information sharing. To achieve this, the collabora-
tion platform performs access control, which limits
the actions (e.g., read, write) that a user can take on a
resource in the system (e.g., notes about the status of
a patient) by enforcing access rules that are specified
in access control policies (e.g., (OASIS, 2013)).
In the federation of the platform (see Figure 1),
there are three types of access control policies:
1. Intra-organizational: Firstly, the care organiza-
tions want to constrain their own employees. For
example, the hospital imposes that each of its
nurses can only view data of care receivers ex-
plicitly assigned to him or her, which depends on
internal task assignment.
2. Inter-organizational: Secondly, the care organi-
zations want to control which other organizations
are allowed to access their data. For example, the
hospital trusts the meal delivery service, but not a
private hospital that also uses the platform.
3. Cross-organizational: Thirdly, the platform itself
imposes access control polices that apply to all or-
ganizations and individuals using it. For example,
these policies can impose that medical data can
only be read by medical professionals that are not
family members of the related patient, unless ex-
plicitly allowed by that patient.
Enforcing these policies in the federation requires
collaboration because each of the involved organi-
zations remains a separate domain of administration,
i.e., each organization manages its own users and has
its own access policies. As a result, the access con-
trol policies and the data required to evaluate them
are spread over the multiple organizations. Conse-
quently, multiple organizations are involved in eval-
uating these policies. Moreover, these organizations
do not necessarily trust each other with their access
control policies or data.
This collaborative decision making causes many
challenges. Semantically, it leads to challenges such
as how a single user can be identified as the same user
by these multiple organizations, and how the policies
of one organization can reason about the users of an-
other organization while for example the meaning of
the role “nurse” can differ substantially in different
organizational contexts. Technically, it leads to chal-
lenges such as how the different user management and
authorization infrastructures employed by the organi-
zations can interact, and how this federated decision
making can provide suitable performance if commu-
nication is required between multiple separate organi-
zations. And in terms of trust, it leads to challenges
such as expressing trust in the other organizations
in the federation, allowing each organization to keep
sensitive access control data confidential from orga-
nizations it does not trust, and achieving correct deci-
sion making while the trustworthiness of the data re-
ceived from another organization can vary, e.g., Face-
book versus a university hospital.
Prior to this work, other authors have also dis-
cussed challenges for access control in a federated
context (e.g., (Colombo et al., 2010; Freudenthal
et al., 2002; Poortinga-van Wijnen et al., 2010;
Chakraborty and Ray, 2006)). However, a large part
of these challenges still remains and our experience
shows that the technique of federated authorization is
a necessary building block to address these. However,
this technique still poses challenges by itself. There-
fore, this paper focuses on the need for federated au-
thorization in order to spark research on this topic.
3 The need for federated
authorization
As mentioned, we believe that federated autho-
rization is an important enabler for access control
for future collaborative applications. In the short
term, federated authorization is necessary to en-
able organizations to effectively enforce their intra-
organizational policies on remote applications such as
the care platform. In the long term, federated autho-
rization is necessary to address the challenges related
to performance and confidentiality of policy evalua-
tion across the federation.
Let us start by illustrating the need for federated
authorization in the short term. To do this, we fo-
cus on a simplified version of the complete federa-
tion consisting of three organizations (see Figure 2):
(i) a small physiotherapist practice that helps care re-
ceivers with physical exercises, (ii) a mid-size meal
delivery service that delivers hot meals on a daily ba-
sis and (iii) a large hospital that is responsible for
medical examinations and treatments. As said, these
three organizations collaborate via the care platform.
For example, the meal delivery service visits care re-
ceivers most often and can notice that they are not eat-
ing well or are complaining about the effects of their
medication. This is important information that should
be shared with the other organizations.
For the point of all three care organizations the
care platform behaves as a remote web application:
the data in the application are located outside of the
premises of the organizations and the platform is ac-
cessed using a web-based interface. However, the
three organizations involved in this example are very
different in terms of how they typically manage their
own users for this remote application: (i) The physio-
therapist practice is a small organization of only three
physiotherapists and does not have IT infrastructure
yet. Therefore, it chooses to define and manage their
user accounts on the platform itself. As a result, the
platform also hosts the user data of the physiothera-
pist practice. While this approach duplicates user data
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Figure 2: A simplified version of the federation of organiza-
tions involved in the collaborative care platform consisting
of three organizations of different size.
for every application that the physiotherapist practice
employs, the resulting management overhead is lim-
ited because of the small size of the practice. (ii) The
meal delivery service on the other hand is larger than
the physiotherapist practice. It employs around thirty
caregivers and utilizes its own centralized user man-
agement infrastructure for assigning care receivers to
care givers and managing paychecks and holidays.
(iii) Finally, the hospital is the largest organization of
the three. It employs over three hundred nurses and
physicians. The hospital utilizes a similar infrastruc-
ture for user management as the meal delivery service,
plus a central authorization service for all its applica-
tions. Both the meal delivery service and the hospital
would like to integrate their existing infrastructures
with the platform in order to conserve their efficient
management. For example, adding a new user or ac-
cess rule should only require changes to be made in
exactly one place.
Integrating the collaboration platform with the
user management infrastructures of the meal deliv-
ery service and the hospital can be achieved using
federated authentication techniques (SAML, 2005;
OpenId, 2013). Authentication is the part of access
control that confirms the stated identity of a user, for
example by checking the combination of a username
and password. Federated authentication externalizes
authentication from the platform as shown in Fig-
ure 3. As a result, the user data of the meal delivery
service and the hospital are also externalized from the
platform and can be centralized for all the applica-
tions they employ. Moreover, sensitive data such as
user passwords are not shared with the platform.
However, user management is only part of the
complete access control management. After users
have been defined, the organizations have to specify
the access policies that constrain them. Traditionally,
these policies are deployed on and evaluated by the
platform. This approach has the following disadvan-
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Figure 3: High-level overview of federated authentication:
when the user make a request to the platform (step 1), the
platform asks the organization of the user for an authentica-
tion statement (step 2). This organization authenticates the
user locally (e.g., by asking for his password, steps 3 and
4) and returns the identity of the authenticated user to the
platform afterward (step 5).
tages:
• It requires the platform to provide an access con-
trol infrastructure sufficiently expressive to sup-
port all rules of all organizations potentially in-
volved in the federation.
• It requires an organization to specify its policies
for every application it employs. This hinders a
new organization to join the federation because
of the larger initial management overhead and in-
creased authorization management afterwards.
• It forces the organization to disclose its policies
and the data required to evaluate them. These
policies may be sensitive because they reason
about competitors, and these data may include in-
ternal information of the organization, which is
sensitive for competitive reasons, or even patient
data, which are sensitive for privacy reasons.
Similar to user management, the increased authoriza-
tion management required for this approach is not
practically feasible for an organization of the size
of the hospital, which requires to reuse or at least
integrate its centralized authorization infrastructure.
Moreover, independent of the size of the organization,
the necessary disclosure of sensitive policies and user
data either limits the expressiveness of these policies
or hinders the adoption of the platform itself.
Federated authorization can address these disad-
vantages, as it externalizes policy evaluation from the
application similarly to federated authentication (see
Figure 4). As a result, federated authorization relieves
the platform of the burden to provide a generic and
complex access control infrastructure. Federated au-
thorization also lowers the initial administration over-
head when a new organization joins the platform since
existing policies and user accounts can be reused.
Moreover, federated authorization conserves the cen-
tralized administration of the hospital, even when us-
ing remote applications. Finally, federated authoriza-
tion enables the hospital to enforce access control on
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Figure 4: High-level overview of federated authorization:
When a user makes a request to the platform (step 1), the
platform asks the organization of the user for an access con-
trol decision (step 2). This organization evaluates its poli-
cies locally (step 3) and returns its decision (step 4), which
the platform enforces afterward.
the platform without having to disclose its policies or
the data required by them. The main disadvantage of
federated authorization is its complexity. However,
the value of the four benefits listed above grows with
the size of the organization. Federated authorization
therefore is an important enabler for the adoption of
collaborative e-health platforms (and more generally,
remote applications) by large organizations.
As such, this scenario illustrates the need for
federated authorization for enforcing the intra-
organizational policies of an organization on remote
applications. This technique can also be applied to
more complex policies and usage scenarios in the fed-
eration. For example, the cross-organizational poli-
cies imposed by the platform itself require access con-
trol data spread over multiple organizations. For these
policies, federated authorization enables an organiza-
tion to evaluate their part of the complete policy with-
out having to share the data required for this. This
approach can also improve performance of cross-
organizational policy evaluation by evaluating parts of
a policy close to the data they require instead of trans-
porting the data itself, which is especially relevant if
the organizations in the federation have separate IT
infrastructures. As such, federated authorization is a
necessary building block for federated access control
in both short and long term.
4 Key requirements for federated
authorization
The previous section has motivated the need for
federated authorization in the context of a collabora-
tive care platform. Federated authorization has been
discussed by other authors, e.g., (Poortinga-van Wij-
nen et al., 2010), and initial attempts have been made
to create supporting run-time environments, e.g., (De-
cat et al., 2013; Lischka et al., 2009). Moreover, sim-
ple domain-specific instances of federated authoriza-
tion are already used in practice, e.g., for credit card
payments where the bank of the customer is contacted
to authorize the payment. However, while the basic
concept of federated authorization is fairly intuitive,
many open research challenges still remain before it
can be realized in a practical setting, amongst others
because of the complexity of real-life federations as
described in Section 2.1. In the remainder of this
section, we discuss our key requirements for feder-
ated authorization in terms of policy language sup-
port, run-time support and standardization.
Policy language support. Existing policy lan-
guages such as XACML (OASIS, 2013) already pro-
vide extensive constructs for specifying access rules
within a single organization. However, these lan-
guages and their underlying models should be ex-
tended to support federated authorization. Firstly,
policies should be able to refer to other organizations
in the federation and incorporate the result of their
policy evaluation. This basic requirement has been
addressed by previous research (Lischka et al., 2009;
Decat et al., 2013). Secondly, these policy languages
should also be extended to support reasoning about
other organizations as a whole. For example, organi-
zations should be able to express their trust in other
organizations in the federation and incorporate this
trust in their access decisions. Thirdly, since real-
istic federations can be large and members can join
and leave frequently, these policies require language
mechanisms that make abstraction of specific mem-
bers of the federation, e.g., higher-level federation
roles such as “home care provider”, “caterer” or “hos-
pital”. As such, existing paradigms such as role-based
access control (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) and attribute-
based access control (Jin et al., 2012) can serve as a
first step to address these challenges.
Run-time support. Next to specifying policies for
federated authorization, a supporting run-time execu-
tion environment is required, with at its core the pol-
icy engine. In terms of policy evaluation, federated
authorization requires these engines to be able to con-
tact the engines of other organizations. Again, this
basic requirement has already been addressed in liter-
ature (Lischka et al., 2009; Decat et al., 2013). How-
ever, employing federated authorization in practice
requires additional features of policy engines. For ex-
ample, by employing federated authorization, policies
are also evaluated in a distributed fashion. If these
policies have side-effects (e.g., obligations (OASIS,
2013)), some form of concurrency control is required
to ensure correctness. Moreover, while federated au-
thorization can be employed as a performance tactic,
it still entails communication with a remote organiza-
tion. Therefore, it requires performance tactics itself
to keep its latency low, e.g., decision caching, caching
of access data or policy splitting. Since access control
is a security feature, the proven correctness of each of
these tactics is essential.
Interoperability through standardization. Cross-
cutting to the above, standardization is key to the
successful adoption of federated authorization, es-
pecially to achieve dynamic and large-scale feder-
ations. More precisely, federated authorization re-
quires standardized policy languages, data sharing
formats and access control orchestration mechanisms.
Initial steps in this direction are currently being made,
e.g., by the OASIS working group on cloud authoriza-
tion (CloudAuthZ, 2013).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we motivated the need for feder-
ated authorization in the context of a collaborative
care platform. Federated authorization is a tech-
nique to externalize policy evaluation from an appli-
cation. Federated authorization is a necessary build-
ing block for access control in the federations of or-
ganizations that arise from current and future inter-
organizational collaboration platforms. In the short
term, this technique can facilitate the adoption of col-
laborative platforms by large organizations which re-
quire centralized user management. In the long term,
this technique can be employed to evaluate cross-
organizational policies efficiently while keeping sen-
sitive data confidential. Although this paper mainly
focused on a single collaborative e-health platform,
our interactions with industry partners have confirmed
the need for federated authorization in other domains
that rely on inter-organizational collaboration, such as
electronic document processing (PUMA, 2014) and
payment services (SPARC, 2014). However, while
the concept of federated authorization is fairly intu-
itive, there are still research challenges that should be
addressed to achieve wide-spread adoption. We will
continue our work on these challenges and hope that
this position paper has sparked the interest of other
researchers.
Acknowledgments. This research is partially funded by
the Research Fund KU Leuven, by the EU FP7 project NES-
SoS and by the Agency for Innovation by Science and Tech-
nology in Flanders (IWT). With the financial support from
the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of
the European Union (B-CCENTRE).
REFERENCES
Chakraborty, S. and Ray, I. (2006). TrustBAC: inte-
grating trust relationships into the RBAC model
for access control in open systems. In SACMAT,
pages 49–58. ACM.
CloudAuthZ (2013). OASIS Cloud Authorization
(CloudAuthZ) TC | OASIS. https://www.
oasis-open.org/committees/cloudauthz/.
Colombo, M., Lazouski, A., Martinelli, F., and Mori,
P. (2010). Access and usage control in grid sys-
tems. In Handbook of Information and Commu-
nication Security.
Decat, M., Van Landuyt, D., Lagaisse, B., Crispo,
B., and Joosen, W. (2013). Federated authoriza-
tion for software-as-a-service applications. In To
be published in the proceedings of DOA-Trusted
Cloud’13.
Ferraiolo, D., Sandhu, R., Gavrila, S., Kuhn, D.,
and Chandramouli, R. (2001). Proposed NIST
standard for role-based access control. TISSEC,
4(3):224–274.
Freudenthal, E., Pesin, T., Port, L., Keenan, E., and
Karamcheti, V. (2002). dRBAC: distributed role-
based access control for dynamic coalition envi-
ronments. In DSS, pages 411–420.
Jin, X., Krishnan, R., and Sandhu, R. (2012). A Uni-
fied Attribute-Based Access Control Model Cov-
ering DAC, MAC and RBAC. In Data and Ap-
plications Security and Privacy XXVI, pages 41–
55. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Lischka, M., Endo, Y., and Sánchez Cuenca, M.
(2009). Deductive policies with xacml. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Secure
web services, pages 37–44. ACM.
OASIS (2013). eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) Version 3.0.
OCareCloudS (2014). OCareCloudS - Overview
projects - iMinds. http://www.iminds.
be/en/research/overview-projects/p/
detail/ocareclouds-2.
OpenId (2013). OpenID Authentication 2.0
- Final. http://openid.net/specs/
openid-authentication-2_0.html.
Poortinga-van Wijnen, R., Hulsebosch, B., Reitsma,
J., and Wegdam, M. (2010). Federated authori-
sation and group management in e-science.
PUMA (2014). Permission, User Management and
Availability for multi-tenant SaaS applications
(PUMA). http://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.
be/research/projects/PUMA.
Samarati, P. and de Vimercati, S. C. (2001). Ac-
cess control: Policies, models, and mechanisms.
In Foundations of Security Analysis and Design,
pages 137–196. Springer.
SAML (2005). Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage (SAML) v2.0. http://www.oasis-
open.org/standards#samlv2.0.
SPARC (2014). Smart Plug-in Automobile
Renewable Charging Services (SPARC).
https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/
research/projects/SPARC.
Vitalink (2013). Home | Vitalink. http://www.
vitalink.be/.
